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Opinion: Rarely a week goes by without a reminder that New Zealand faces a much more contested international environment.
As the war in Ukraine grinds through a third year, the situation in the Middle East escalates.
With the increasing globalisation of technology and conflict, geographical distance provides us less immunity from international insecurity.
Just last week, China launched an intercontinental ballistic missile carrying a dummy warhead that terminated not far from the exclusive economic zone of the South Pacific territory of French Polynesia.
There is a silver lining in these dark clouds. The current era of international rivalry provides an imperative for Canberra and Wellington to reboot the Australian-New Zealand alliance and increase engagement with our South Pacific partners.
This is occurring this week, as New Zealand hosts the Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles and his counterparts for the South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting.
Converging views
The 2023 Australian Defence Strategic Review and the New Zealand Defence Statement of Intent for 2024-28 released last week make clear that Canberra and Wellington share very similar views on the international strategic environment.
The converging views reflect a relationship that is the epitome of security interdependence.
The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s 2023 Strategic Assessment document highlights our “indispensable relationship with Australia”.
This explains why Defence Minister Judith Collins recently said that “any threat to Australia is a threat to us”.
Investment needed
But has the level of our investment in the alliance matched the rhetoric?
Canberra may have some reasonable concerns about Wellington’s investment in the critical defence capability side of the alliance.
On this point, the late Gerald Hensley, New Zealand Secretary of Defence (1991-1999) and Head of the Prime Minister’s Department (1980-86) speaks clearly.
Writing in 2023, Hensley noted that “our security is still tied to Australia’s but as the long peace (after the Cold War) has endured, we have given up on carrying our share of the common defence burden … The outcome is that Australia no longer sees us as a reliable defence partner.”
If this sounds alarmist, it shouldn’t. The first and only mention of New Zealand in the 2023 Australian Defence Review is in page 46 of a 112-page report.
Defence planners are tasked to think clearly and plan accordingly. After all, the essence of an alliance is the obligation to come to a partner’s aid in the event of an attack on either partner’s territory or its military.
This is explicitly stated in Article Five of the Anzus Treaty of 1951-52 which underpins the our alliance with Australia.
Avenues for future-proofing the alliance are clear.
Wellington’s potential participation in the Pillar II component of Aukus is an opportunity to reinvigorate the alliance through a policy of boosting defence interoperability with Canberra.
We also share non-Aukus regional security interests, including the imperative to assist our regional partners and friends in the Pacific Islands.
How will New Zealand exercise its agency?
Two big questions face New Zealand. First, does the social licence exist for a more active defence and foreign policy that features a central role for the alliance?
Second, will the funding for the Defence Capability Plan currently being written up be robustly supported by all our political parties?
The recent missile test is a reminder that dodging hard questions on defence and security will not make them go away.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s 2023 strategic foreign policy assessment highlights “the considerable value in having a more deliberate national conversation on New Zealand’s foreign policy”.
The sooner we start walking the talk the better – starting with an alliance reboot for a new era.